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ARREST-PRIVILEGES-ATTENDING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.-WEALE V.
CLINTON CIRcuIT JUDGE, 123 N. W. 31 (MIcH.).-Held, that where a person
was arrested in another state where he was residing with the relator's
wife, and was returned to Michigan upon a requisition for non-support
of his own wife, he was privileged from arrest upon relator's civil
suit for alienation of relator's wife's affections, made upon the day that
the criminal action was dismissed, and before he had an opportunity to
leave the state.
In criminal cases it is generally accepted that a fugitive from justice,
surrendered by one state upon demand of another is not protected from
prosecution for offenses other than that for which he was surrendered, but
may be tried for any crimes committed in the demanding state either
before or ofter extradition. State v. Kealey, 85 Ia. 94; People v. Cross,
135 N. Y. 536. The majority of states, it seems, extend this doctrine, and
hold that the federal law should not be construed as affording exemption
to him from being subject to civil suits. Reid v. Ham, 54 Minn. 305;
Williams v. Bacon, io Wend. 636 (N. Y.). In these states he is there-
fore not even entitled to exemption from service for a reasonable time
to return to the state from which he was brought by requisition. In re
Walker, 6i Neb. 803. The courts of several states have decided, how-
ever, that service in a civil suit obtained by the surrender of the fugitive
is void. Compton v. Wilder, 40 Ohio St. X30; Moletor v. Sinnen, 76
Wis. 308. In Wilson v. Donaldson, ii7 Ind. 356, the court stated the
reason for this exemption, saying, that one should not be burdened with
the hazard of having to appear and defend a civil action on account of his
defending a criminal action, for such a holding would tend to prejudice
the defendant against his privilege to testify in his own behalf.
CARRIERS-CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS-CARE REQUIRED.-INDIANA UNION
TRAc1TOir Co. v. OHNE, 89 N. E. 507 (IND.).-Held, that a common carrier
is not absolved from liability for injuries, occurring through a car sliding
and colliding with another car, owing to the rails being wet with the rain.
A common carrier must use the highest degree of human care, pru-
dence and foresight to avoid an injury to a passenger. Louis-
ville, etc., R. Co. v. Ritter, 85 Ky. 368; Louisville, etc., R. Co.
v. Swann, 81 Md. 400. And for the slightest negligence with re-
ference to the exercise of such care, he will be liable. Jamison v. San
Jose, etc., Ry. Co., 55 Cal. 593. Thus, running an extra car so close to
the preceding car that it could not be stopped on the slippery rails when
the preceding car had stopped at a street crossing, was held to show
negligence in managing the car. Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Schmidt, 217
Ill. 396. But the negligence must be the proximate and not the remote
cause of the accident. Gillespie v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 6 Mo. App. 554.
However, if the accident resulting in injuries is due to natural causes and
is inevitable, the carrier will not be liable. McPadden v. New York Cent.
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R. Co., 44 N. Y. 478. For carriers are not liable as insurers of the safety
of their passengers. Hall v. Conn. River Steamboat Co., 13 Conn., 319.
Nor can a passenger hold a carrier liable for an injury from any cause,
if his own negligence was a natural and proximate cause contributing to
the injurious result. Penn. R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147; Jamison v.
Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 92 Va. 327.
CORPORATIONs-ADVERSE INTERESTS OF OFFICERs-LEASE" OF PROPERTY
OCCUPIED BY A CORPORATION.-PIKES PEAK CO. v. PFUNTER, 123 N. W. REP.
19(MIcd.).-Held, that an officer of a corporation who secures the renewal
of a lease in his own name, which lease is held at the time of his renewal
by the corporation, holds the new lease as trustee and for the benefit
of the corporation, even though it was in financial difficulties at the time
df such renewal, and was subsequently adjudged bankrupt.
It has been held in a case exactly in point with Pikes Peak Co. v.
Pfunter, that the expectancy of renewal belonging to the corporation
ceased with the landlroad's express refusal to renew, and the. director's
securing the renewal for himself was not such a breach of trust as would
entitle the corporation to interfere with his benefit from it. Crittenden
& Cowler Co. v. Cowler, 72 N. Y. Sup. 701. And in Scott v. Farmers' Nat'l
Bk., 97 Tex. 31, it seems to be implied that an officer may take full title
to himself if there has been made a valid contract to that effect between
him and the corporation. Or if land has been purchased by an officer of
a corporation with his own money, or with money which he supposed
belonged to him, an enforceable trust is not created for the benefit of the
corporation, although it had authorized him to act for it in the purchase
of land ,and he may have intended ultimately to sell the land to the cor-
poration. Camden Land Co. v. Lewis, IOI Me. 78. However, the weight
of authority is that directors of a corporation represent the stockholders
and cannot acquire any interest adverse to them. Cook v. Sherman, 20
Fed. 167. A director's position is fiduciary, and he cannot take advantage
of his position to secure personal rights to the corporate property; for
instance, by buying at an executor's sale of property of the corporation.
Hoffman v. Reichert, 147 Ill. 274. And his fiduciary position demands all
the more that he acquire no property for his own use if such property is
necessary for the purpose of the corporation. Blake, v. Buffalo Creek R.
Co., 56 N. Y. 485. Even where corporate officers execute a contract for
the sale of corporate property to a stranger, a repurchase by them from
such a stranger, while the contract of the corporation is merely executory,
is voidable. Cook v. Berlin Woolen Mill Co., 43 Wis. 433. In fact the
officers are nothing more nor less than trustees for the corporation. Cen-
ter Creek Water & Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay, 21 Utah x92.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONFESSION-WHAT CONSTITUTES.-STATE V. KEE-
LAND ET AL., 104 PAC. 513 (MONT.) Held, that where defendant told
witness that he had committed the crime because of differences which he
had had with the witness and offered to pay him money if the witness
would let him go, such statements were mere admissions, and therefore
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it was not necessary to show that the statements were not induced by
fear, threats or the hope of leniency.
A confession in criminal law, is the voluntary declaration of guilt
made to another by a person who has committed a crime. People v.
Strong, 3o Cal. i5I. Such confession must be voluntary, that is, not in-
duced by any promise of forbearance or threat of punishment. Hopt v.
Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 584. A confession is restricted to an acknowledgment
of having committed the act for which the confessor is being tried. People
v. Parton, 49 Cal. 632; State v. Jackson, 95 Mo. 623. So a statement of
fact not constituting an actual confession of guilt is not a confession and is
not admissible as such. It may, however, be admissible as an admission.
State v. Picton, 51 La. 624.
.CRIMINAL LAW-EWENcE-TEsTIMONY ON A FORAMR TRIAL-HoLI-
FIELD V. CITY OF LAUREL, 50 SO. 488 (Miss.).-Held, that testimony of a
witness against the defendant on a prosecution in the police court may not
be used on the trial on appeal to the circuit court, though the witness has
removed from the state.
The general rule is that where testimony was given under oath, in
a judicial proceeding, to which the adverse litigant was a party, and
where he had the power to cross-examine, the testimony so given is
admissible in any subsequent suit between the parties, after the decease of
the witness, or when he is out of the jurisdiction of the court, or when
he cannot be found after diligent search, or when he is being kept away
by the opposite party. i Greenleaf Ev., 16th ed., Sect. 163. But, the
courts of this country are not in harmony on this point. In some juris-
dictions such evidence has been ruled inadmissible, unless it appeared
that the witness was absent through the connivance, or by the procure-
ment of the accused. State v. Wing, 66 Ohio St. 407.' While other courts
have held such evidence admissible only when the doctrine of necessity
arises; i. e., when no amount of diligence can bring the witness into court.
State v. Jordan, 34 La. Ann. 1219. And such evidence is inadmissible,
unless it is shown that the full process of the court has been vainly in-
voked in an effort to compel the attendance of the absent witness. State
v. Evans, 65 Mo. 574. But in any case it must be shown that the de-
fendant had the opportunity of subjecting the witness to cross-exam-
ination at the former trial. Garcia v. State, 12 Tex. App. 335.
GRAND JURY-QUALIFICATION OF JURORs-TAXABLE PERSONS-NORTH
CAROLINA STATUTE.-U. S. v. BREESE, ET AL., 172 FED. 761.-Held, that a
code provision providing that grand jurors should be selected from persons
only who had paid tax for the preceding year, does 'not disqualify a
person from being a legal grand juror who did not own property above
the amount exempt from taxation, and was not therefore assessed with
any tax for the preceding year.
The disqualification of a grand juror prescribed by statute is a mat-
ter of substance, which cannot be regarded as a mere defect or imper-
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fection of form, within the meaning of a statute providing that no indict-
ment shall be deemed insufficient, or the trial, judgment or other pro-
ceedings thereon be affected, by reason of any defect or imperfection in
matter of form only, which does not tend to the prejudice of the de-
fendant. Crowley v. U. S., i94 U. S. 461. Under the code provision men-
tioned in headnote, an indictment was rightly quashed when three of the
grand jurors had not paid taxes for the preceding year. State v. Dur-
ham Fertilizer Co., III N. C. 658. But objection under said code provision
does not disqualify a grand juror 21 years old, who was not liable
for poll tax the preceding year, and may have had no property liable to
taxation. State v. Perry, x22 N. C. ioi8. A covenant to transfer all his
taxable property does not make one ineligible to serve as grand juror
under such a statute. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 4 Leigh (Va.) 663.
Where a person appears on thie assessment roll as owning no land except
that which is exempt, he is a taxable person within a statute requiring
grand jurors to be taxable persons. State v. Carlson, 39 Ore. ig.
INJUrNCION-COMINATIONS-INTE EREC .c WITH CONTRACT BY THIRD
PERSONS.-HITCHMAN COAL CO. V. MITCHELL ET AL., 172 RED. 963.-Held,
that an employer and employes may lawfully contract with respect to the
terms of employment, and as incidental thereto that the employes shall
not join a labor union and that the employer shall not employ union men;
and when such a contract has been made, a combination between officers
or members of a labor union, to induce either party to violate the con-
tract, with which they have no rightful concern, constitutes an unlawful
conspiracy, to restrain the carrying out of which, the other party is en-
titled to an injunction.
The preponderance of authority is in accord with the leading case
and, as a general rule, equity will grant an.injunction to restrain a com-
bination, which is formed to induce employes, who are not dissatisfied
with the terms of their employment, to strike for the purpose of inflicting
damage upon the employer. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 Mo.
212; United States v. Haggerty, 1i6 Fed. 5io. And likewise, where one
adopts a system in his business of employing only non-union workmen,
and of stipulating in his contracts with them, that they shall join no
union, interference therewith, enticing, or endeavoring to entice them to
join a union will be enjoined. Flaccus v. Smith, ig Pa. 128. But induce-
ments offered by way of entreaty and persuasion, where intimidation is
not used, have been held insufficient to grant an injunction. Reynolds v.
Everett, 144 N. Y. i8g. But in such cases the remedy is damages in a
court at law. Haight v. Bodgeley, i5 Barb. 499. And the right of em-
ployers to sue for relief, where third parties are interfering, in any man-
ner whatsoever, with their employes, against the latter's consent, has been
upheld. Frank & Dugan v. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443. And, in accord, an
injunction is the proper remedy to restrain third parties from doing acts,
or making threats and inducements, without justifiable cause, to prevent
a party to a contract, from carrying out the same. Employing Printers
Club v. Blosser, 122 Ga. 5og; American Law Book Co. v. Thompson, 84
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N. Y. Supp. 225. But some authorities deny the right, in the absence of
unlawful means, such as fraud or deceit. Boysen v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578;
Perkins v. Pendleton, go Me. 166.
INSANE PEasoN-AcniON BY GUARDIAN-PAYMENT ON CONTRAcT-RE-
COVERY OF PAYMENT.-GOLDBERG V. WEST END HOMESTEAD Co., 73 AT. 128
(N. J.) .- Held, that in a suit by a guardian of a lunatic to recover money
paid by the lunatic upon a contract for the sale of land, knowledge of the
insanity by the defendant must be proved.
In accord with the principal case, many courts hold that where a party
contracting with a lunatic acts in good faith and in ignorance of insanity,
the contract will be upheld. Scott v. Hay, go Minn. 304; Haines v. Scott,
54 N. Y. Supp. 844. Some courts follow this rule when the sane party
cannot be placed in statu quo. Smith's Committee v. Forsythe, 28 Ky.
Law Rep. 1034. But it has been held that ignorance of the insanity will
not uphold a contract. Feigenbaum v. Howe, 66 N. Y. Supp. 378. And
this rule has been followed even where an ordinarily prudent person could
not discover insanity. Orr v. Equitable Co., xo7 Ga. 499. And some courts
hold the contract binding only when the lunatic has received actual benefit
Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 32 Vt. 659.
INSURANcE-WHAT CONSTUTUTES "Fn'--O'CoNNOR V. QUEEN INS.
Co. OF AmEIcA, 122 N. W. io38 (Wis.).-Held, that a fire in a furnace
of material so highly inflammable in character as to cause volumes of heat
and smoke to escape through the registers into the rooms, damaging the
house and furniture, though without ignition outside of the furnace, is a
"fire" within the policy of insurance against "direct loss or damage by
fire." Marshall, J., dissenting in part.
In general, fire insurance policies should be construed so as to give
effect to the evident intention of the parties. Ripley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 30
N. Y. 136; Snyder v. Groff, 8 Pa. Dist. 291. And, if the policy is suscep-
tible to two constructions, that construction should be adopted which is
favorable to the insured. Forest City Ins. Co. v. Hardesty, 182 Ill. 39;
Imperial Shale Brick Co. v. Jewett, 169 N. Y. 143. The prevailing doc-
trine as to injury to insured property by heat, although the heat is caused
by combustion, seems to be that if the injury does not result from fire
outside of its usual place of confinement, such as a furnace, it is not
covered by the policy. This rule has been applied, and the damage not
held to be covered by the policy, when the scorching of sugar in a re-
finery resulted from overheating the pans used in drying. Austin v. Drew,
4 Campb. 361 (Eng.). The same rule was applied to damage to a library,
due to a break in the steam heating pipes, resulting in the charring of
furniture and books, Gibbons v. German Ins., etc., Inst., 30 Ill. App. 263,
to damage by smoke from the flame of a flaring lamp, Fitzgerald v.
German-American Ins. Co., 30 Misc. (N. Y.) 72, or from smoke and soot
escaping from a defective stove pipe. Cannon v. Phoenix Ins; Co., nro
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Ga. 563. But where a fire in a chimney caused by the accidental ignition
of soot damaged the insured property, it was held that the loss was by
fire within the terms of the policy. Way v. Abington Mut. Ins. Co., 166
Mass. 67.
JURY-COMPETENCY OF JURORS-RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION.-SEARLE V.
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SPRINGFIELD, 89 N. E. 8og (MAss.).-Held,
that where a party to an action, relating to the ownership of a building
on land purchased, was a Roman Catholic bishop, a corporation sole, who
held title to the land in trust for a local Roman Catholic church, it was
error to exclude from the jury all persons of Roman Catholic faith, with-
out reference to their residence, or to any close affiliation with the local
church.
The smallest degree of direct interest is a decisive objection to a
juror. Lynch v. Horry, I Bay (S. C.) 22.. So in actions between the
trustees of different religious denominations, involving the right of pos-
session of lands, the members of each denomination interested in the
lands are incompetent to act as jurors. Cleage v. Hyden, 53 Tenn.
73. But an indirect interest, however great, will not so exclude
jurors and witnesses. Walker's American Law, 9th ed., p. 671. It is no
objection to a juror that he is a member of a religious denomination, but
not of the particular congregation whose property rights are involved in
the issue to be tried. Barton v. Erickson, 14 Neb. 164. Nor is the fact
that one party is a free mason ground for disqualifying other free masons
from sitting on the jury. People v. Horton, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 9; Reed v.
Peacock, 123 Mich. 244.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-PuBLIc DEBT-AM TO CORPORATIONS.-
FISHER ET UX. V. CITY OF SEATTLE ET AL., IO4 PAC. 655 (WASH.).-Held,
that a constitutional provision prohibiting cities from loaning their money
or credit in aid of any other corporation, does not apply to the issue of
funding bonds for the payment of debts of territory annexed to the city.
The law is well settled that where a municipal corporation is legis-
lated out of existence, and its territory annexed to another corporation, the
latter, unless the legislature otherwise provides, becomes entitled to all
its properties and immunities, and is liable for all its then existing debts.
Morgan v. City of Beloit, City and Tourt, 7 Wall. 613; Thompson v.
Abbott, 61 Mo. 176. And in such a case, the present existing municipal
corporation is vested with the power to raise money, wherewith to pay
the liabilities and debts, by levying taxes upon the property transferred
and upon the persons residing therein. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, ioo
U. S. 514. Likewise, where the municipality has the power to
contract a debt, it also has the implied power of resorting to the usual
method of raising revenue to pay it; and this usual method is by tax-
ation. Commonwealth v. Perkins et al., 43 Pa. St. 400. It has also been
held that the debts contracted for, by a city in its acquisition of property,
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which is for the benefit of taxpayers, must be paid by the city. Wheeler
v. Phila., 77 Pa. St. 338. Neither does the constitutional provision, pro-
hibiting a city from loaning its money or credit in aid of any other cor-
poration, restrict municipalities from constructing their own railroads and
paying therefor when necessary and when authorized by the legislature.
Sun Printing Co. et. al. v. Mayor et als., of New York, 152 N. Y. 257. And
so it has been held that even though a city is required in the first instance
to pay the cost of a public burden, to be reimbursed thereafter by a tax
upon the property, this does not constitute a loan to the property owners
within the constitutional prohibition against loaning. People v. Banks,
67 N. Y., 568.
PATENTS-INFRINGEMENT--USE OF ARTICLE BROUGHT FROM FOREIGN
COUNTRY.-DAUNLER MFG. CO. V. CONKLIN, 170 FED. 7o.-Held, that a pur-
chaser, in a foreign country of an article patented in the United States, al-
though from one authorized to sell it, is chargeable with infringement if
he brings it into the United States and there uses it.
It is well settled that an article, patented in the United States, pur-
chased in a foreign country from one authorized to sell it, cannot be im-
ported for sale in the United States. Boesch v. Graff, 133 U. S. 697. And
some cases hold that there is no difference between using and selling.
Petherstone v. Ormonde Cycle Co., 53 Fed. iio. But many courts hold
that the sale of a patented article by an assignee within his territory
carries the right to use it everywhere. Edeson Co. v. Goelet, 65 Fed. 613.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONs-EMPLOYMENT-CONTRACTS.-HALL V.
ALLEN, 104 PAC. 489 (CoL.).-A brother, twenty-five years old, without
means and away from his parents was injured and a physician began to
treat him. A sister subsequently wrote to the physician requesting in-
formation as to his condition and stating that the expenses would be paid.
Held, that the sister directly employed the physician at her own expense,
authorizing a recovery against her for services rendered after the receipt
of the letter.
Where there has been a promise, express or implied, to pay for the
services rendered by a physician to a third person, the physician has a
right to maintain an action against the person making such promise to
recover for professional services. Bradley v. Dodge, 45 Howe Pr. 57
(N. Y.); White v. Mastin, 38 Ala. 147. And such liability is not affected
by the fact that the liability was not assumed until after the physician
had made several visits to the patient without the knowledge or procure-
ment of such person. King v. Edmiston, 88 I1. 257. He may also re-
cover where the circumstances are such as to show an intention to pay
him for his professional services. Smith v. Watson, 14 Vt. 332. Some
states even hold that one who requests a physician to attend another,
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without indicating that he acts as agent or messenger, is liable for his
charges. Best v. McAuslan, 27 R. I. io7. Contra: Others hold that a
promise to pay will not be implied unless the relation of that person to the
patient is such as raises a legal obligation on his part to call in a phy-
sician and pay for the services. Meisenback v. Southern Cooperage Co.,
45 Mo. App. 232; Starrett v. Miley, 79 Ill. App. 658. For example, where
the manager of a hotel, in which yellow fever had broken out among the
guests, sent a telegram to a neighboring town to send a physician, the
manager was held not liable for services rendered. Williams v. Brickell,
37 Miss. 682.
